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INTRODUCTION
The current system of discovery in the federal courts can produce enormous costs for both litigants and the court system. These costs stem from
the overuse of both discovery in general and costly mandatory discovery
procedures that are relevant in only a small subset of litigation. The alleged
costs of discovery have spawned a number of articles and studies in recent
years condemning the federal system of broad discovery.1
In a pair of recent cases, the Supreme Court responded to the criticism
of rising discovery costs by instituting a heightened pleading standard
meant to prevent meritless litigation from reaching the discovery stage.2
Unfortunately, this crude attempt to rein in unnecessary discovery also
threatens to kick much meritorious litigation out of the courts by preventing under-resourced plaintiffs from invoking the authority of the courts to
gather basic information crucial to their cases.3 Better solutions to the
problem of discovery costs would address the system of discovery itself.
The primary problem with the current rules of discovery is that they
sweep too broadly. Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
1 See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE A DVANCEMENT OF THE
AM. LEGAL SYS ., UNIV. OF DENVER, FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE
INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2-3 (2009)
[hereinafter IAALS REPORT], available at http://iaals.du.edu/library/publications/ACTL-IAALS
_Final_Report_rev_8-4-10.pdf (noting that “discovery can cost far too much and can become an
end in itself”); Gordon W. Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the Norm,
Rather than the Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513, 522-32 (2010) (discussing the costs imposed by
a broad system of discovery and suggesting reforms to limit “over-discovery”).
2 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (noting that conclusory statements and
threadbare allegations of wrongdoing will not suffice to “unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (concluding that a requirement
of more specific allegations at the pleading stage is probably the only way “to avoid the potentially
enormous expense of discovery” in frivolous cases).
3 See Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 140-66 (2011)
(presenting data showing that cases that are more likely to be dismissed under the new heightened
pleading standard are just as likely to be ultimately successful as those that would survive the new
heightened pleading standard).
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transsubstantive—meaning that the same rules apply in every type of case—
the discovery rules are not narrowly tailored to the requirements of any
particular case. Transsubstantivity was one of the guiding tenets in the
creation of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the principle
has come under attack more recently.
The creation of substance-specific (nontranssubstantive) rules, especially
in the area of discovery, holds promise for reducing costs by replacing broad
rules with rules that are narrowly tailored to particular types of litigation.
Narrowly tailored rules will help reduce waste and abuse in the discovery
process. A system of nontranssubstantive rules will also allow rulemakers to
make deliberate choices about how discovery can be used as a tool to
promote goals of substantive and procedural fairness, thereby allowing rulemakers to decide when costly discovery would or would not be appropriate.
The drafting of nontranssubstantive rules would also present rulemakers
with many challenges. The extent of discovery permitted in litigation can
have an enormous effect on the course and outcome of a case. Therefore,
rulemakers would have to make value-based decisions about how much and
what types of discovery to allow in any given substantive area. This process
would undoubtedly be beleaguered by heightened interest group lobbying.4
Rulemakers recognize at least two kinds of transsubstantivity.5 “Casetype” transsubstantivity means that the same rules apply regardless of the
subject matter of the litigation (e.g., securities fraud, employment discrimination, breach of contract). “Case-size” transsubstantivity implies that the
same rules apply regardless of the amount in controversy or the complexity
of the suit.6 In this Comment, I seek to show that the federal system of
discovery would benefit from nontranssubstantivity of both types, with a
primary emphasis on case-type nontranssubstantivity. Ultimately, I argue
that the discovery rules should be different for different types of litigation.
In Part I, I provide a brief review of the current federal discovery rules
by discussing their importance to litigation and the breadth of the system of
discovery. I also review some of the most important criticisms that scholars
4 To some extent, lobbying of rulemakers already occurs. Because the substance-specific
rulemaking process would have to deal more openly with the value judgments associated with
procedure, and because interested parties would be able to target more narrowly the procedures in
which they have an interest, it is highly likely that substance-specific rulemaking would be
susceptible to even more lobbying. See infra note 112.
5 See Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting
the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 378 (2010) (noting these two types of
transsubstantive rules).
6 This Comment uses the term “transsubstantivity” to mean case-type transsubstantivity,
unless otherwise specified Correspondingly, “nontranssubstantive” rules are those that apply
differently depending on the subject matter of the litigation.
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and practitioners have leveled at the discovery procedures. Part II of this
Comment focuses on transsubstantivity by examining the history of
transsubstantive rules in the federal system and discussing the advantages
and problems associated with transsubstantive rules. In Part III, I give
examples of state jurisdictions that use nontranssubstantive discovery rules
and examine a number of possible models.
In order to place the nontranssubstantivity suggestion in a broader context, Part IV examines two alternative reforms to the discovery rules.
Analysis will show that the judicial discretion over discovery through active
case management results in a waste of resources and impairs the ability of
the courts to manage cases fairly and consistently. Reforms that would
impose nontranssubstantivity of the case-size variety—that is, by applying
different rules depending on the amount in controversy—should be
successful in lowering the cost of discovery and streamlining case management. The implementation of case-size nontranssubstantivity alone,
however, would be insufficient to address the problems plaguing the current
discovery system. Such a reform would do little to curb costs in the largest
cases where broad discovery would still be available to litigants.
In Part V, I propose a system of nontranssubstantive discovery rules
that takes advantage of the benefits offered by these two alternative reform
strategies. A nontranssubstantive system of discovery rules will reduce the
overall cost of discovery through narrowly tailored rules. It will also allow
rulemakers to allocate the costs of discovery in order to promote the
substantive goals underlying the litigation, particularly for causes of action
that Congress has previously sought to encourage through devices such as
fee-shifting. The Comment goes on to discuss the process that the creation
of nontranssubstantive discovery rules would entail. I assert that the
primary challenge that rulemakers will face will be in making decisions that
will determine how discovery rules should affect substantive law and
substantive rights. I suggest a number of practical reforms that could be
implemented in a nontranssubstantive system to reduce costs.
Finally, this Comment proposes that the rulemaking committee that
would be best equipped to craft a nontranssubstantive system of discovery
rules would bring together experts and practitioners from all sides of the
issue. Because of the substantive decisions that the committee would have
to make and the political pressures from interest groups that it would have
to confront, the rulemaking body would be best situated in the legislative
branch. Although reform of the discovery system of the type recommended
in this Comment would require a major overhaul of the federal discovery
rules, nontranssubstantivity holds out the promise of narrowly drawn
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procedures that would reduce costs while still providing litigants with the
tools necessary for the efficient development of their cases.
I. A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF DISCOVERY
AND CRITICISMS THEREOF
A. The Importance of Discovery in American Litigation
Discovery plays an essential role in the modern system of American
litigation. Modern American procedure assumes that “[m]utual knowledge
of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation.”7 Discovery is aimed at providing both the litigants and the
factfinder with the information necessary to reach an accurate determination of the issues. In addition, ensuring that parties have access to all
relevant facts to present to a neutral factfinder may further the important
goal of procedural fairness.8
Broad discovery is essential to a notice-pleading system in which a
plaintiff is not required to know the facts necessary to succeed on his claim
before initiating litigation. Broad discovery allows a plaintiff who knows
merely that he has been wronged to leverage the power of the courts to gain
access to the information that will allow him to prosecute a successful case.9
Extensive discovery is thus essential to an effective system of notice
pleading designed to provide advantages to under-resourced plaintiffs who
cannot afford the private discovery required by a fact-pleading system.
To the extent that the extensive system of federal discovery allows
plaintiffs easier access to courts, discovery supports the political role that
private litigation plays in the United States.10 In this system, the powerful
7
8

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
Litigants who feel that they have been able to present a full picture to the factfinder are
more likely to find the proceeding fair and to accept the determination of the factfinder. See infra
subsection V.B.1.
9 The recent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal may have significantly altered the noticepleading system and raised the bar for notice pleading, partly in an effort to curb the rising costs
of discovery. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. However, to the extent that the plaintiff
need not provide all of the evidence at the pleading stage, discovery will still be essential in
allowing him to build his case.
10 See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: P UBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 21-31 (2010) (describing how congressional choices to encourage private
litigation affect the level of enforcement of federal law); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 71-77
(2010) (describing the importance of pleading standards with regard to statutorily authorized
private litigation); Seymour Moskowitz, Rediscovering Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the Level
Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 600-01 (2002) (“Pretrial information gathering is critical,
not only to individual cases, but also to the political role litigation plays in the United States.”).
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force of private litigation can be harnessed, through legislative choice, as a
method of enforcement of statutory and administrative law.11 Private
litigation has indeed often been used as an alternative to a more bureaucratic state.12 Dean Carrington has noted the privatization of enforcement,
especially in the areas of antitrust, consumer protection, securities regulation, civil rights, and intellectual property law.13 In particular, Carrington
argues that private litigation is most effective in protecting civil liberties
and the rights of those with fewer resources, because private litigants cannot
be co-opted by powerful interest groups as easily as administrative agencies.14
Discovery is a powerful tool in enabling private litigants to vindicate their
rights because it gives them investigative abilities that their limited
resources would otherwise render unavailable.15
B. The Breadth of the American Discovery System
To support a notice-pleading system and private enforcement of statutory law, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily prescribe an
extremely broad system of discovery in which litigants can use multiple
mechanisms to discover a vast range of information. Edson R. Sunderland,
the main architect of the rules of discovery in the initial Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, created a uniquely extensive system of discovery by
incorporating into the rules access to all of the known American, and
perhaps English, devices of discovery.16 Whereas previous systems of
discovery might have provided for one or two of these discovery mechanisms (such as either interrogatories or depositions, but not both), Sunder11 See FARHANG, supra note 10, at 71-72 (“[W]ith private enforcement regimes Congress can
hope to achieve its aims on the cheap, and to minimize blame for what implementation costs are
borne by the government.”).
12 For a larger discussion of the role of private litigation in the enforcement of statutory and
administrative law and the legislative choices involved in such an allocation of enforcement power,
see infra subsection V.B.2. Farhang notes that job discrimination lawsuits are the largest source of
litigation in federal courts other than habeas petitions. See FARHANG, supra note 10, at 3.
Although the legal bases for such suits are often federal statutes, 98% of these suits are litigated by
private parties. See id.
13 See Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997) (“Private
litigants do in America much of what is done in other industrial states by public officers working
within an administrative bureaucracy.”).
14 See id. at 54-55 (“[I]t was confirmed a thousand times in the first half of this century that
regulatory agencies tend to be co-opted by those whom they regulate.”).
15 See Ken I. Kersch, The Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights and the New American
State, 16 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 84 (2002) (comparing discovery to the broad investigatory
power given to administrative agencies).
16 Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 718 (1998).
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land’s initial rules provided litigants in the federal system with access to any
and all devices that might be of use to them.17 Sunderland’s motivation was
his support for a notice-pleading system and his belief in discovery as a way
to cure problems of “waste, delay, and unfairness.”18 By making all of the
issues in dispute and relevant facts known to each of the parties and the
court prior to trial, discovery would allow judges to dispose of meritless
litigation through summary judgment, and permit attorneys to focus their
efforts and time on better arguing the most important issues in those cases
that did proceed to trial.19
Due to various criticisms regarding the cost and time involved in such
broad discovery, reform efforts since the 1970s have largely served to limit
discovery.20 Thus, recent amendments have enhanced sanctions for discovery
abuse, imposed numerical limits on the use of certain devices (depositions
and interrogatories),21 and explicitly barred the use of disproportionate
discovery.22
The scope of discoverable materials has also been narrowed from the
very broad “relevance to the subject matter” standard, although the court
retains discretion to order subject matter discovery.23 The current rules still
afford broad discovery by making discoverable “any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”24 Furthermore, discovery is
still not limited to material that would be admissible at trial.25 All the

17
18

See id.
Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting
Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 597-98 (2004).
19 Id.
20 See Moskowitz, supra note 10, at 607 (“The thrust of the amendments to the federal rules
since then has been toward containing the cost and time expended on the exchange of pretrial
information.”).
21 Presumptive limits for certain discovery mechanisms have proven effective in reducing the
use of those types of discovery. JUDICIAL CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES &
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF
THE U NITED S TATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 9 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 CIVIL LITIGATION CONFERENCE REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/2010%20report.pdf. Some have proposed placing such limits on
other discovery devices, such as document requests and requests for admission. Id.
22 See generally Moskowitz, supra note 10, at 607.
23 Gregory S. Weber, Potential Innovations in Civil Discovery: Lessons for California from the
State and Federal Courts, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1051, 1060-62 (2001). The effect of this
narrowing of the basic scope of discovery is still debated. 2010 CIVIL LITIGATION CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 8.
24 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
25 Id.
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original discovery devices are still available to litigants, even if some of
them have been limited by subsequent amendments.26
The current discovery process begins with initial disclosures. Except in
certain exempted types of cases,27 each party must disclose the names of all
individuals likely to have discoverable information that the disclosing party
may use to support its claims or defenses.28 Each party must also disclose a
copy of all the documents it may use to support its claims or defenses, a
computation of damages claimed, and any insurance agreement under which
an insurer may be liable for part of a possible judgment.29 In addition, each
party must disclose to the other parties the names of any expert witnesses it
may use at trial.30 Each expert witness must usually prepare a report about
himself and the testimony he will offer at trial for inclusion in this disclosure.31 Each party must also make a pretrial disclosure that lists the witnesses
and exhibits that it plans to present at trial.32
As early as possible in a proceeding, the parties are to confer to plan the
discovery.33 At this meeting, the parties arrange for the required initial
disclosures, discuss any issues about preservation of discoverable material,
and develop a discovery plan.34 The discovery plan should describe the
parties’ views on the proper scope and schedule of discovery, potential
changes to the limitations on discovery imposed by the rules, and other
discovery issues.35 This discovery plan may be followed by one or more
pretrial conferences with the presiding judge.36 The district judge should
issue a scheduling order that may modify the timing and extent of disclosures and discovery, among other matters.37
The federal rules provide for discovery through a limited number of oral
depositions,38 depositions by written questions,39 or written interrogatories
to parties.40 A party can also request that another party produce documents
or physical evidence or permit entry onto property for inspection or
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (1938), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (2010).
Exempted cases are listed in FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B).
Id. 26(a)(1)(A).
Id.
Id. 26(a)(2).
Id.
Id. 26(a)(3).
Id. 26(f)(1).
Id. 26(f)(2).
Id. 26(f)(3).
Id. 16(a)(1).
Id. 16(b)(3).
Id. 30.
Id. 31.
Id. 33.
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testing.41 The court can order a party to submit to a mental or physical
examination, the report of which may be available to all parties.42 The final
method of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
parties to request that other parties admit the truth of certain pertinent
matters; this device allows the parties to narrow the scope of the issues in
question.43
The court may usually alter the limitations on discovery.44 In particular,
the court should limit discovery on its own or at the motion of a party when
the burden of proposed discovery would be unreasonable.45 The court can
issue a protective order forbidding or modifying discovery that could cause
embarrassment or excessive burden to a party.46 A court can also issue an
order to compel a resisting party to make the required disclosures and to
respond to discovery requests.47
The discovery system under the federal rules is broad in both the scope
allowed and the variety of methods permitted. The disclosure requirements
seek to expedite the process by requiring parties to turn over certain
materials without making the opposing party submit a discovery request.
The scheduling and pretrial conferences are also intended to make the
process work more efficiently and predictably. However, there are numerous circumstances that necessitate the court’s involvement in the discovery
process, and the court is often expected to play some role in limiting
discovery.
C. Criticisms of the Current System of Discovery
In the last thirty to forty years, the American system of broad discovery
has come under attack as unfair, inefficient, and costly.48 Some scholars and
practitioners, mostly defendants’ organizations, argue that parties are able
to use the broad tools of discovery to impose costs on their adversaries that
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. 34(a).
Id. 35.
Id. 36.
Id. 26(b)(2)(A).
Id. 26(b)(2)(C).
Id. 26(c)(1).
Id. 37(a).
According to one recent study, fewer than half of the trial lawyers surveyed opined that
the discovery system works well. IAALS REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. Seventy-one percent thought
that discovery is sometimes used to push an opposing party to settlement. Id. But see CTR. FOR
CONST. LITIG., NINETEENTH C ENTURY RULES FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY C OURTS ?
1-2 & n.6 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20
Materials/Library/CCL,%2019th%20Century%20Rules%20for%2021st%20Century%20Courts.pdf
(questioning the neutrality of the organization that published the IAALS Report).
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push those adversaries toward settlement.49 Parties are incentivized to settle
rather than incur the costs of litigation, even if they know that they would
prevail on the merits. As Justice Souter asserted in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, “the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases.”50 The discovery costs for litigants should
not only be measured in the cost of producing requested documents,
answering interrogatories, or sitting for depositions; litigants are also
burdened by the delay that discovery can create in litigation.51
But the concern that blameless defendants may be pushed to settlement
by the threat of discovery has been questioned. There is not enough
empirical evidence to support these claims, and the evidence that does exist
is ambiguous.52 Perhaps for that reason, critics of extensive discovery often
resort to anecdotal evidence.53 A recent survey by the Federal Judicial
Center found that 27.4% of plaintiffs’ attorneys and 30% of defendants’
attorneys reported that the costs of discovery increased the likelihood of
settlement in a recent case about which they were questioned.54 However,
the number of these cases in which the settlement was unfair is unclear.
Discovery that exposes private corporate or personal information to the
eyes of the public may also be deemed unfair.55 This type of discovery may
49 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 647 (1989) (“The
paradigm impositional discovery request comes from a party thinking it has a relatively small
chance of prevailing . . . but wanting to convey the message: ‘This suit will cost you $1 million
whether I win or not; we can split that in settlement.’”); Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 523.
50 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
51 Some of the increase in the median length of litigation in recent years has been attributed
to the time required for extensive discovery. See Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 523. In 1992, the
median number of months before a civil case came to trial was fifteen; in 2008, the median case
waited almost twenty-five months before coming to trial. Id. at 523-24.
52 Miller, supra note 10, at 62-63 (“[T]he costs may be somewhat overstated—or partially
self-inflicted—and certainly they are not universally imposed across the litigation universe . . . .
The truth is that no one really knows. The empirical research has not investigated that deeply and
it may prove difficult to reach beyond the impressionistic.”).
53 Id. at 63 (noting that “there is no common definition of what is abusive or frivolous or
excessive or purely tactical”); see, e.g., Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck, & Stephen B. Burbank,
Debate, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 141, 156-57 (2009) (Herrmann & Beck, Closing Statement), http://www.pennumbra.
com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf (citing the twenty million documents contained in the
“electronic document depository in the Enron Securities Litigation”).
54 EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR ., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER N ATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL R ULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE A DVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL R ULES 32 (2009), available
at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/ lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf.
55 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2242 (1989) (“[P]roduction of the documents violates a
principle of privacy which corporate and governmental officials consider ought to protect them.
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subject the decisions of corporate and governmental officials to secondguessing by the public and may lead government agencies and corporations
to refrain from creating written communications or leaving paper or
electronic records.56 Parties may be pushed to settle out of fear that their
sensitive documents will be released in discovery.
The current system of broad discovery is also likely to be inefficient in
some cases, because it places the cost on the producing, rather than the
requesting, party. Because this allocation of cost externalizes the cost of
demanding more discovery, economic theory suggests that parties would
conduct an inefficient amount of discovery.57 The limited ability of judges
to predict the value of as-of-yet undiscovered information and the costs
involved in litigating protective-order motions make Rule 26(b)(2)(C)—
which requires judges to limit discovery that would impose a burden that
outweighs its potential benefit58—an imperfect solution to the inefficiency
problem.59 Scholars and practitioners have come to terms with the idea that
not every fact should be discoverable. Endless discovery mining for the
missing nugget that might provide the factfinder with an additional fact
may not be worth the cost; furthermore, it can often price litigants out of
the system.60 The problem of inefficient discovery may also be compounded
by the perverse incentives on attorneys to stretch out the discovery process
in order to run up their clients’ bills.
Corporate and government documents that are worth discovering express the thoughts of people
with burdensome responsibilities making confidential decisions about tough and often insoluble
problems.”); Kersch, supra note 15, at 85 (noting that the “sweeping and unprecedented, statesupported powers to gather facts” that private lawyers possess on behalf of their private clients
“clearly rais[e] anxieties about the value of privacy”). An early book on discovery published a few
years before the promulgation of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure noted that
discovery abuse was a concern in certain types of cases, even at that time. See GEORGE
RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 30-31 (1932). In some types of actions—especially
those relating to seduction, malicious prosecution, divorce proceedings, or election contests—
depositions were sometimes threatened as blackmail. Id. at 31. Newspapers would print sensational
material obtained through the parties’ discovery, thereby embarrassing the litigants. Id. However,
this type of abuse was infrequent, and to protect the parties’ privacy interests, the court could
order depositions be kept confidential and sealed until offered into evidence. Id.
56 Hazard, supra note 55, at 2242-43 (noting how the risk of such wide exposure has resulted
in careful usage of written language).
57 Easterbrook, supra note 49, at 637-38 (“Notice that both normal and impositional requests
may inflict on the responding party costs substantially greater than the social value of the information.”).
58 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
59 See Easterbrook, supra note 49, at 638-39 (“Judicial officers cannot measure the costs and
benefits to the requester and so cannot isolate impositional requests.”).
60 See Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 517-18 (noting that in order to make the civil justice
system available to litigants with small claims, as well as those with large claims, “not every
conceivably relevant fact should be discoverable”).
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Even an attorney acting in furtherance of his client’s interests may exploit the delays accompanying discovery in order to increase the costs for
the other party. Such conduct is tolerated by current professional responsibility rules. The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct instruct a lawyer to “make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client.”61 Such delaying conduct is also not
necessarily subject to sanction by a court.62
The main criticisms of a system of broad discovery focus on its costs. In
particular, document discovery is the most costly form of discovery,
especially in an increasingly digitized world. Preserving and gathering the
massive amounts of e-mails and electronic records produced by corporations
can run the costs of some litigation into the millions of dollars.63 This
problem is particularly perplexing due to the importance of document
discovery, which often helps parties figure out which questions to ask in
depositions.64
The strength of the cost argument is unclear, however, because it is
difficult to identify how many cases involve disproportionate discovery.65
There are certainly some cases in which the cost of discovery is enormous.
These cases may involve dozens of depositions, thousands of pages of
documents, and hundreds of gigabytes of digitized information.66 However,
many suits—perhaps one-half to one-third—involve no discovery, and in
“the vast majority of cases,” discovery is in fact limited to a reasonable
amount.67 Indeed, a report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules from
the late 1990s suggests that discovery was not used at all in almost 40% of
cases.68 However, discovery was costly in cases in which it was employed—
when actively utilized, discovery can represent as much as 90% of a case’s
61
62

MODEL RULES OF PROF ’ L CONDUCT R. 3.2 (1983) (emphasis added).
Cf. Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985) (“Within the
limits of professional propriety, causing delay and sowing confusion not only are [the lawyer’s]
right but may be his duty.” (quoting Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1267, 1288 (1975))).
63 See Herrmann et al., supra note 53, at 156-57 (Herrmann & Beck, Closing Statement)
(noting the authors’ personal and second-hand experience with litigation involving document
preservation and e-discovery costs in the millions of dollars).
64 See Hazard, supra note 55, at 2239.
65 Subrin, supra note 5, at 392-93 (“We do not know if the so-called large cases constitute five
percent, ten percent, or more of the entire federal docket.”).
66 See id. at 392 (“[T]here [is] a substantial number of cases in which the amount of discovery
is overwhelming by any standard . . . .”).
67 Id.; see also 2010 CIVIL LITIGATION CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 7 (“Empirical studies conducted over the course of more than forty years have shown that the discovery
rules work well in most cases.”).
68 H.R. Doc. No. 106-228, at 53 (2d Sess. 2000).
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litigation costs. The excessive costs of discovery in such active cases means
that, despite the fact that no discovery was used in many other cases,
discovery nonetheless comprised about half of the total litigation costs in all
cases.69
A more recent survey of lawyers in recently closed cases, undertaken by
the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), estimated that, at the median, discovery
accounted for 20% to 27% of the costs of litigation.70 However, discovery
expenditures only amounted to, at the median, between 1.6% and 3.3% of
the stakes involved for the parties—a seemingly small price to pay.71
Furthermore, although some defendants’ groups may make a lot of noise
about the costs of discovery, the FJC survey suggests that most practitioners questioned regarding a representative sample of cases did not think that
discovery was too expensive.72 Instead, over 50% of both plaintiffs’ and
defendants’ attorneys questioned thought that the amount of information
generated by discovery was “just the right amount,” and over 50% of both
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys thought that the costs of discovery
were “just right” compared to their clients’ stakes in the litigation.73
Other criticisms of the federal system of discovery focus not on the use
of discovery itself, but on the inefficiency and delay caused by the rules
regulating discovery. Mandatory steps in the discovery process, such as
initial disclosure and pretrial conferences,74 may cause unnecessary expense
and delay in those cases where discovery is relatively simple.75 Additionally,
much expense is generated by satellite litigation seeking to clarify the
applicability of the discovery rules or in adjudicating motions for protective
orders or orders to compel discovery.
Critics of the current system of expansive discovery thus level attacks at
the system on the basis of its unfairness, inefficiency, and cost. These
criticisms are certainly accurate to some degree or in some cases, although
the extent of the asserted problems is unclear. But even if the system of
discovery is problematic only in a small subset of litigation, reforms should
still attempt to lower the cost of discovery in those cases. Additional
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id.
LEE & WILLGING, supra note 54, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 27-28.
Id.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (providing for pretrial conferences and orders meant, in part,
to modify the extent and timing of discovery); id. 26(a)(1) (listing items that parties must disclose
even before receiving a discovery request).
75 See 2010 CIVIL LITIGATION CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 9; Subrin, supra
note 5, at 389 (asserting that additional steps in the discovery process imposed to constrain the
system only cause more expense).
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empirical research should shed light on the extent of the problems and the
types of cases in which they are most prevalent.76 Although the research
currently available does not suggest that the system of federal rules permitting broad discovery is completely broken, it does support serious consideration of reform.
II. TRANSSUBSTANTIVITY AND ITS LIMITS
A. A History of Transsubstantive Rules and Transsubstantive Discovery
The English common law system was distinctly nontranssubstantive;
different writs were litigated pursuant to their own distinct procedures.77 In
1848, the drafters of the Field Code in New York chose to break with the
English common law tradition and employ transsubstantive rules of
procedure.78 The Field Code was eventually adopted by over half the
states.79 The drafters of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also
chose transsubstantivity in the mid-1930s.80
The Rules Enabling Act authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate
“general rules” for “practice and procedure.”81 Based on this text, the Advisory
Committee that drafted the Rules debated and ultimately rejected the
contention that it could create different rules to be applied in district courts
of different states. However, the Advisory Committee simply assumed,
without debate, that the Rules should also be case-type transsubstantive.82
It is not clear whether the Advisory Committee thought that the Rules
Enabling Act required it to draft transsubstantive rules—as there is no
record of any debate on the matter—but there are a number of explanations
for its choice to draft the rules in this way.
It took the English common law writs centuries to evolve procedures
specific to each cause of action; it would be nearly impossible for a fourteenperson committee to create substance-specific procedures in just a few

76 In particular, class action, mass torts, and antitrust cases are reported to be particularly
problematic in terms of discovery cost and abuse. Herrmann et al., supra note 53, at 156
(Herrmann & Beck, Closing Statement).
77 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 379.
78 Id. at 378-81.
79 Id. at 378.
80 Id.
81 Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)) (emphasis added).
82 Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 110-11 (2009).
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years.83 Furthermore, simplicity was one of the primary goals underlying
the push for a uniform set of federal procedures.84 The pre-1938 rules were
extremely complicated: federal courts sitting in equity applied one set of
rules while courts at law had to conform to the procedural codes of the
states, which could contain thousands of sections.85 Additionally, there were
“federal practice rules” for instances where the state code was inapplicable
to the federal litigation.86 The Advisory Committee achieved the goal of
simplicity through a single set of procedures to be used for all causes of
action.87
Another reason for the choice of transsubstantivity was that prevailing
conceptions at the time held that procedure and substantive law were
distinct entities.88 Procedure was not supposed to influence substantive
outcomes.89 This conceptual distinction between procedure and substance
was easiest to entertain if the procedures employed were not determined by
the subject matter of the action.90 To create substance-specific procedure
might admit that there were multiple valid ways to litigate and that the
choice of procedure was based on substantive values.91 On a related point,
to the extent that procedures crafted to fit a particular cause of action
influenced the outcome of that litigation, the original rulemakers might
have feared that the promulgation of nontranssubstantive rules would
violate the Enabling Act’s directive to the Supreme Court not to “abridge,
enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.”92

83
84
85

Subrin, supra note 5, at 383.
See id.
See David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 371 (2010) (“[A] federal judge in New York, for example,
would have juggled equity rules, a procedural code with 1,536 sections, and special ‘federal practice
rules’ for instances when the state code was inoperable or inapplicable for federal litigation.”
(footnotes omitted)).
86 Id.
87 The Rules Enabling Act specifically authorized the Supreme Court to create one set of
rules for all causes of action, whether they were “cases in equity” or “actions at law.” Pub. L. No.
73-415, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)).
88 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 384.
89 See id.
90 See id. (“If different rules were to be drafted for different types of substantive cases, then
procedure and substance look considerably less distinct . . . .”).
91 See Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Persistence of Progressive Proceduralism, 61 TEX. L. REV .
929, 945 (1983) (book review) (“If there is more than one scientifically valid way to litigate, then
the choice of one or the other procedural system must be based on values; in other words, the
selection of one mode of proceeding over another is a political choice.”).
92 Rules Enabling Act § 1; see Subrin, supra note 5, at 384.

258

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 243

At common law, the rules of discovery were historically always transsubstantive.93 By contrast, most matters of procedure traditionally followed
the substance-specific dictates of writs.94 Thus, an important 1932 book by
George Ragland on discovery in America and England noted that the norm
in most jurisdictions was that discovery was available in any type of civil
action.95 Although discovery was much more common in certain types of
actions, particularly those involving automobile accidents or personal injury,
the rules of discovery were transsubstantive.96 Ragland noted that there was
discovery abuse at that time in certain types of cases—including seduction,
malicious prosecution, and divorce proceedings—although it was considered
infrequent.97
The assumption that the federal rules should be transsubstantive has
remained, despite recent calls for substance-specific reform in certain
discrete rules.98 Congress has more recently enacted laws altering procedure
in specific substantive areas, such as prison litigation99 and securities
litigation.100 Many states have heightened pleading requirements in medical
93 See RAGLAND, supra note 55, at 27 (“There are no prohibitions or restrictions upon the
use of discovery, as far as the type of action is concerned, in most jurisdictions which have
procedures for discovery before trial.”).
94 See supra notes 77 & 83 and accompanying text.
95 RAGLAND, supra note 55, at 27.
96 See id. at 27-28 (noting the frequency of discovery in various types of actions). There were
a few exceptions to this norm of transsubstantivity. Discovery was not permitted in actions to
enforce forfeitures or penalties in England and Ontario on the grounds that courts of equity
should not assist in the enforcement of penalties. Id. at 28; EDWARD BRAY, THE PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE OF DISCOVERY 346 (London, Reeves & Turner 1885). These considerations
gave rise to splits among the courts in whether there could be discovery in certain types of
litigation. See RAGLAND, supra note 55, at 28-30. The Indiana courts did not permit discovery in
divorce proceedings. Id. at 29; see also Simons v. Simons, 8 N.E. 37, 37 (Ind. 1886) (describing the
use of interrogatories in divorce actions as “improper” because outside of the statutory scheme).
Discovery was not permitted in summary actions in New York because the delay it entailed was
deemed to be inconsistent with the legislative purpose in creating such actions. Dubowsky v.
Goldsmith, 202 A.D. 818, 818-19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922); RAGLAND, supra note 55, at 29.
97 RAGLAND, supra note 55, at 31.
98 Burbank, supra note 82, at 111.
99 See, e.g., Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, sec. 802, § 3626(e)(2), 110
Stat. 1321-66, 1321-68 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) (2006)) (allowing for
automatic stay of prospective relief upon motion to modify or terminate such relief); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(d) (limiting the amount of compensable attorney’s fees); § 1997e(g) (allowing for waiver
of reply). The Prison Litigation Reform Act was meant to address the burden on the courts posed
by an overwhelming amount of prisoner lawsuits and the problem of prison micromanagement by
judges. Marcus, supra note 85, at 404-06.
100 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 altered procedure in an attempt to
prevent abusive claims. Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 737; see H.R. REP. 104-369, at 3132 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). Its provisions heighten pleading standards, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1), allow
for a stay of discovery pending disposition of a motion to dismiss, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B), and
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malpractice suits.101 But no one is advocating a return to a system with
totally different procedural rules for different areas of substantive law.102
Nevertheless, there has recently been a push for substance-specific rules
of discovery. Thus, although they have largely copied the procedures found
in the federal rules since their promulgation in 1938, states have recently
begun to abandon the federal model of transsubstantive discovery rules.103
There are currently hundreds of variations among discovery rules throughout the country.104
A push for nontranssubstantive discovery rules has also been seen at the
federal level. In recent months, with the encouragement of the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
team formed by the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA)
has begun working on pattern interrogatories and pattern requests for
production for use in employment discrimination litigation.105 A plaintiff in
a relevant case would have the opportunity to submit these standardized
interrogatories or requests for production to the defendant with his complaint, and the defense could then attach its own set of pattern interrogatories
or requests to his answer.106 The goal of this project is to identify those
types of discovery requests standard in employment discrimination cases
lay out the requirements for the selection of the lead plaintiff in a class action, 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(3)(B).
101 See Benjamin Grossberg, Comment, Uniformity, Federalism, and Tort Reform: The Erie
Implications of Medical Malpractice Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 222-25 (2010)
(surveying state certificate of merit statutes that require the plaintiff to consult with an expert
prior to or just after filing suit); see also Marcus, supra note 85, at 407-09 (noting that many state
legislatures passed the certificate of merit statutes as part of a larger program of substantive
reform of medical malpractice liability, thereby underscoring the use of procedural rules as a
mechanism to influence substantive outcomes).
102 Burbank, supra note 82, at 111.
103 See Marcus, supra note 85, at 404 (“[S]tate legislatures have enacted substance-specific
procedural reforms to accomplish particular goals of substantive policy.”); see also Weber, supra
note 23, at 1052 (describing the interest of the California Law Revision Commission in discovery
reform and suggesting models of nontranssubstantivity after surveying variations in the discovery
laws in each of the states).
104 Weber, supra note 23, at 1052 (noting the “hundreds of differences” in discovery rules
across the states).
105 Memorandum from Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil
Procedure, to Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 14
(Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/
CV12-2010.pdf; see infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text for discussion regarding pattern
interrogatories.
106 Memorandum from Joseph D. Garrison, NELA Liaison to the Advisory Comm., &
Rebecca M. Hamburg, NELA Program Dir., to Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Judicial Conf. Advisory
Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure 2 (Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2010-11.pdf at 627.
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that are least objectionable to the parties.107 Strong presumptions in favor of
the appropriateness of discovery contained in these protocols would
discourage disputes at this stage.108 The use of pattern discovery would
make the discovery process for this information quicker and less costly.
NELA hopes that upon completion of the pattern discovery sets, a pilot
project will be undertaken to test the workability of pattern discovery.109
While the use of pattern discovery may speed the initial discovery process
in certain cases by identifying what material is likely to be most relevant to
the litigation, the project does not seek to alter the underlying discovery
rules, which would remain generally applicable. Nevertheless, this project
evidences a first attempt in the federal system to tailor discovery mechanisms to the substance of the litigation.
B. The Case for Transsubstantivity
The main arguments for transsubstantivity remain those that likely influenced the Advisory Committee when it drafted the original Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.110 Promulgating a single set of transsubstantive
rules greatly simplifies the federal judicial system for practitioners. Lawyers
and judges must learn only a single set of rules, and need not grapple with
the question of which rules should apply when substantive categories of law
overlap. Retaining the transsubstantive system means that Congress (or a
rulemaking committee) does not have to take on the burdensome task of
debating and enacting rules for each cause of action.
As briefly noted above, transsubstantive rules also have the benefit of
largely, though not completely, removing value judgments from the task of
crafting procedure. Transsubstantive rules force rulemakers to work at a
level of abstraction at which it is difficult to affect materially the outcomes
in a particular substantive area of law.111 Because the rulemakers are not
asked to make political or social decisions, transsubstantivity reduces the
risk of interest groups asserting pressure to influence particular areas of law.112
107
108

Id.
See id. at 3 (noting the potential for pattern discovery to reduce the need for costly multiple rounds of motions).
109 Id.
110 See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
111 See Marcus, supra note 85, at 379.
112 See Miller, supra note 10, at 124-25 (noting that reform to a nontranssubstantive system
would likely be influenced by client interests); Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System,
and Procedural Reform in Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 1011 (2004) (“[I]f
the federal rulemakers considered rules targeted at specific kinds of litigation, the resulting rules
would favor the interests of those groups that were best able to influence the rulemaking
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Because transsubstantive rules must be broadly formulated in order to
be applicable to every substantive area, Geoffrey Hazard has asserted that
an additional benefit of these rules is that they allow for change and legal
development from unexpected avenues.113 Thus, one advantage of broad
discovery rules, as opposed to narrowly tailored rules, is that they allow for
more flexibility and creativity in unexpected ways. Lawyers practicing
under broad rules are less constrained by rulemakers who may be stuck in
traditional ways of thinking.
C. The Limits of Transsubstantive Rules
The problems associated with transsubstantive rules largely arise from
the fact that such rules are by necessity overly broad when applied in any
particular case.114 Because the rules must fit any type of litigation, they lack
the crisp applicability and incisiveness of narrowly drawn rules, and can
thereby result in a waste of time and money.115 The broad rules are often
not sufficient to guide the course of litigation, and therefore the system
depends on additional limiting procedures and judicial discretion to give
process.”). To some extent, special interest groups already lobby Congress to enact procedural
reforms that most benefit them. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of
Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1705 (2004) (“[L]obbying by lawyers and others led
members of Congress to perceive that some issues of court practice and procedure either could be
used to generate political support among certain interest groups or in any event might require
attention in order to preserve such support.”). It is true that even in a transsubstantive system,
interest groups can and will make calculations about how particular rules will help them in those
cases that matter to them. For example, the Chamber of Commerce might calculate that
heightened pleading standards would help large corporations by protecting them from shareholder
suits. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 18-26, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126) (urging the
Court to consider the risk of abusive litigation and adopt a higher pleading standard). Even
though such standards might hurt business in other types of cases, such as contract disputes, the
Chamber might have calculated that on average heightened pleading standards help big business.
The effects of such lobbying, however, are likely dampened in a transsubstantive system because
interest groups and rulemakers must work at a certain level of generality. See Linda S. Mullenix,
Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV.
795, 837 (1991) (arguing that if the Civil Rules Advisory Committee makes the transition to
nontranssubstantive rules, “[i]nterest group lobbyists represent[ing] partisan interests . . . will
pressure for interest-specific procedural rules”).
113 Hazard, supra note 55¸at 2246-47 (“Formulation of new theories of legal rights is simpler,
virtually by definition, under a pleading system that is not constructed in terms of old legal
categories, as was code pleading and common law pleading. Proof of new theories of liability
likewise is simpler with the aid of comprehensive discovery.” (footnote omitted)).
114 See Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for
Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 41 (1994) (“It is this perceived need to
cover all cases with one rule which leads to less effective restraints throughout the process.”).
115 Subrin, supra note 5, at 388.
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sufficient guidance. Disclosure, discovery conferences, scheduling conferences, and pretrial conferences are all meant to provide additional opportunities to narrow the application of the rules, but they also require additional
expenditure of resources.116 In the absence of such narrowing processes,
disputes over the applicability of the rules are likely to arise, thereby
causing only more delay and cost.117
If narrowly crafted rules provided sufficient direction to litigation ex
ante, however, these expensive and time-consuming narrowing procedures
could be avoided. For example, if there were particular rules for discovery
in medical malpractice suits, discovery conferences in such cases might be
unnecessary to prevent discovery abuse because the parties would already be
limited by narrowly drawn rules.
A further problem inherent in employing overly broad rules is that
much discretion is necessarily left to the judge in determining how the rules
should be narrowed and applied in a particular case.118 Discretion can be
problematic, as similar cases may be treated differently depending on the
presiding judge.119 Because procedure can have a great effect on outcome,
transsubstantive rules may, ironically, sacrifice uniformity of result.120
Although a certain amount of flexibility may be desirable, such flexibility
should be built into the rules intentionally, rather than as a necessary safety
valve for overbroad rules.
Some critics of the transsubstantive nature of the federal rules note that
some of the factors that motivated the original Advisory Committee to use
transsubstantive rules are no longer applicable. Simplicity may not be as
necessary today as it was in 1938 because modern lawyers and many judges
focus their practices on specialized areas of law.121 Thus, lawyers and judges
will have no problem learning and employing the relevant procedures.
Furthermore, substance-specific rules may be more necessary now because
more complicated fields of litigation, requiring more specialized procedures,

116
117

See id. at 389.
See Subrin, supra note 114, at 40 (noting the “interpretive disputes” caused by the automatic disclosure provisions). As an example of the uncertainty caused by the overbroad rules,
Subrin notes that the automatic disclosure rules are drafted so broadly that in complex cases like
product liability, toxic tort, patent, and securities class actions, automatic disclosure rules, in the
absence of any limiting principle, may create endless piles of disclosed documents. Id. at 38-40.
118 For a discussion of problems inherent in active judicial case management, see infra
Section IV.A.
119 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 391.
120 Id.
121 Marcus, supra note 85, at 372-73.

2012]

Nontranssubstantivity and Discovery Reform

263

have arisen since 1938.122 A primary example of this phenomenon is the
class action lawsuit, which can involve millions of plaintiffs.123
In contrast to transsubstantive rules, substance-specific rules can be
narrowly tailored to the needs of the particular type of litigation. Fewer
disputes over the applicability of the rules and less need to further narrow
the requirements of the rules would allow judges to be less involved in
discovery—thus giving them more time to hear other cases on the merits—
and would save money and time.124
III. JURISDICTIONS WITH NONTRANSSUBSTANTIVE
DISCOVERY RULES
To a limited extent, some of the federal rules of discovery are already
nontranssubstantive: in particular, some of the disclosure rules are nontranssubstantive. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(B) exempts nine
types of cases from the initial disclosure requirements. These types of cases
include petitions for habeas corpus, actions to quash an administrative
summons, and actions to enforce an arbitration award.125 In amending the
disclosure provisions to include these exceptions in 2000, the Advisory
Committee intended to identify cases where there was likely to be little or
no discovery and thus where disclosure would not contribute to the effective
development of the case.126 Because the rules prior to the 2000 amendments
permitted local rules to alter the requirements of disclosure, the committee
looked to the categories of cases that had been excluded by local rules.127 At
the time, the committee thought that these exceptions would be applicable
in about one third of all civil filings.128
A number of states have also experimented with nontranssubstantive
discovery rules to some extent. Various states exempt broad classes of cases
from disclosure requirements. Alaska rules create an exemption from state
disclosure requirements in adoption,129 paternity, custody, small claims, and

122 See id. at 372 (noting “enormously complicated fields of litigation that beg for specialized
procedural treatment”).
123 Id.
124 See Subrin, supra note 114, at 50 (“Finally, judges can begin to return to their proper
roles—deciding, or facilitating the decision of cases on their merits; making decisions about cases
that apply to more than the one case that is in front of them; and having rules to guide them in
their future decisions.”).
125 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B).
126 See id. 26 advisory committee note (2000 amend.).
127 See id.
128 Id.
129 ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(a).
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eminent domain cases, among other types of litigation.130 The Colorado
rules exempt mental health, water law, forcible entry and detainer, and
certain other proceedings from the normal disclosure procedures.131 Alaska
and Colorado both have separate disclosure rules that dictate different
disclosure procedures for divorce and legal separation cases.132 In addition
to exempting cases in some of the categories already mentioned, Utah
further exempts from the disclosure requirements actions for reviewing
proceedings of an administrative agency, for post-conviction or extraordinary
relief, to enforce an arbitration award, and for water rights adjudication.133
Another popular device among the states is uniform or pattern interrogatories, which set out a list of standard questions to be answered by the
litigants in certain types of cases.134 Some states require parties to answer
the standard interrogatories, while others only encourage their use. For
instance, Arizona incentivizes the use of the “Uniform Interrogatories” in
medical malpractice, personal injury, and contract cases135 by providing that
each uniform interrogatory and its subparts shall be counted as only one
interrogatory toward the forty interrogatory limit, while any subpart to a
nonuniform interrogatory will be counted as its own interrogatory.136
Connecticut, in contrast, limits the use of interrogatories in personal
injury actions arising from the operation or ownership of a motor vehicle or
the ownership of real property exclusively to its uniform interrogatories,
unless a judge orders otherwise.137 The rule does not require that the
uniform interrogatories be used in every case, and a party only need answer
the interrogatories if served with them.138 The New Jersey rules demon130
131
132
133
134

Id. 16(g).
COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(a).
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26.1; COLO. R. CIV. P. 16.2(e).
UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3)(A).
Seymour Moskowitz, Discovery in State Civil Procedure: The National Perspective, 35 W. ST.
U. L. REV. 121, 125-26 (2007). As mentioned supra in notes 105-09 and accompanying text, a
recent effort is underway to experiment with nonmandatory pattern discovery in the federal
courts.
135 The rules provide forms of interrogatories labeled with these categories. However, the
rules provide that the uniform interrogatories can be used in any type of proceeding. ARIZ. R.
CIV. P. 33.1(f).
136 ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1(a), 84 forms 4-6. Colorado and Maryland have similar rules. See
COLO. R. CIV. P. 33(e) (“Any pattern interrogatory and its subparts shall be counted as one
interrogatory. Any subpart to a non-pattern interrogatory shall be considered as a separate
interrogatory.”); MD. R. CIV. P. 2-421(a) (“Each form interrogatory contained in the Appendix to
these Rules shall count as a single interrogatory.”).
137 CONN. R. CIV. P. 13-6(b). The relevant forms are located in the appendix to the rules. Id.
138 Id. 13-6(a) (“In any civil action . . . any party may serve . . . written interrogatories . . . .”)
(emphasis added); see also id. 13-6(c) (setting forth the procedure for serving the form interrogatories on a party represented by counsel).
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strate a third variation, in which the parties in an action subject to uniform
interrogatories are automatically deemed to have been served with the
uniform interrogatories, which they must then answer, upon being served
with the complaint or answer to the complaint.139
Some states limit requests for production in a similar manner. In Connecticut, requests for production are limited in certain types of cases to
those set out in forms.140
Many states have medical malpractice “certificate of merit” statutes that
require a plaintiff in a malpractice action to consult with an expert when
filing suit.141 These statutes may alter the general discovery rules by
determining the timing of expert-report disclosures and permitting (or
requiring) the discovery of advice from nontestifying experts, even where
the discovery rules might otherwise preclude such discovery.142 Some states,
such as Arizona, further modify the discovery rules for medical malpractice
cases.143
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida has a case
management system that separates cases into three tracks depending on
their complexity.144 The first track is reserved for actions for review of an
administrative record, habeas corpus petitions or other challenges to a
criminal conviction, actions brought without counsel by a person in custody,
actions to enforce or quash an administrative summons, actions by the
United States to recover benefit payments or collect on student loans,
proceedings ancillary to proceedings in other courts, and actions to enforce
an arbitration award.145 The third track contains class action, antitrust,
securities, mass tort, and other complex litigation, as well as actions
139 N.J. R. CIV. P. 4:17-1(b)(2). England has pre-action protocols that describe standard
disclosures that the parties should undertake even before commencing an action. See CIV. P.R.,
Practice Direction: Pre-Action Conduct 1.2 (Eng.), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/
procrules_fin/contents/practice_directions/pd_pre-action_conduct.htm (stating that it is a goal of
the Practice Direction to encourage parties to exchange information prior to suit); see also, e.g.,
CIV. P.R., Pre-Action Protocol for Personal Injury Claims, Annex B (Eng.), available at http://
www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/protocol/prot_pic (listing standard information to
be disclosed by the parties prior to the commencement of various types of personal injury actions).
140 CONN. R. CIV. P. 13-9(a) (providing that in all vehicular and real property–related
personal injury actions, all requests for production “shall be limited to those set forth in Forms
204, 205 and/or 206 of the rules of practice, unless, upon motion, the judicial authority determines
that such requests for production are inappropriate or inadequate”).
141 Grossberg, supra note 101, at 218.
142 Id. at 257-60.
143 See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2 (mandating the exchange of certain records and limiting discovery in medical malpractice cases).
144 M.D. FLA. R. 3.05.
145 Id. 3.05(b)(1).
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affecting the public interest in a way that warrants heightened judicial
attention, such as school desegregation or voting rights cases.146 All other
cases fall into track two.147 Track-one cases are managed by the presiding
judge or a magistrate judge according to the ordinary rules,148 except that
they are exempt from the initial disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(a)(1).149 In track-two cases, counsel are additionally
required to meet and file a Case Management Report that includes a
detailed discovery plan and timeline, among other requirements.150 The
court may then order a preliminary pretrial conference with the parties
before it issues a Case Management and Scheduling Order establishing a
discovery plan, and additional pretrial conferences as necessary.151 In trackthree cases, the preliminary pretrial conference is required.152
States also use substance-specific discovery rules in other ways. The
New York rules attempt to minimize the burden on producing parties in
personal injury or injury to property cases by not permitting a party to
serve interrogatories on and conduct a deposition on the same party.153
Wisconsin places numerical limits specifically on discovery by prisoners
appearing pro se and provides for an automatic stay of discovery upon a
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, unless the court
decides that the prisoner has a reasonable chance of prevailing on the
merits.154
Numerous variations of nontranssubstantive discovery rules exist among
the states, and the movement for nontranssubstantive discovery rules is
growing. The most common rules exempt certain types of litigation from
disclosure, streamline the discovery of basic information in simple cases
through the use of pattern discovery, or limit the use of discovery to a
certain number of incidents in particular kinds of cases.
IV. DISCOVERY REFORM ALTERNATIVES TO AND
VARIATIONS ON NONTRANSSUBSTANTIVITY
The most balanced proposals for reform for the federal system of discovery focus on ways to give litigants direction in the discovery process in a
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Id. 3.05(b)(3).
Id. 3.05(b)(2).
Id. 3.05(c)(1).
Id. 3.05(d).
Id. 3.05(c)(2)(B).
See id. 3.05(c)(2)(D).
See id. 3.05(c)(3)(C).
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3130 (McKinney 2012).
See WIS. STAT. § 804.015 (2012).
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more narrowly tailored manner. Aside from a shift to substance-specific
rules, two other proposals have received attention by scholars and rulemakers. The first would have judges more actively manage discovery. The
second would have different discovery rules apply to different cases,
depending on the value of the claim. Neither of these proposals would do
enough to rein in discovery costs, however, and each would raise new
problems for the system.
A. Active Judicial Case Management
One proposed solution to the abuse and overuse of discovery is to have
judges take an active role in managing discovery.155 Judges would examine
discovery requests to ensure that they are reasonably aimed at uncovering
useful information and that the cost of the requested discovery is reasonable
in comparison to the expected value of the information sought. Such an
approach would necessarily grant more discretion to judges to make
individualized determinations in their cases. Case management has already
taken a particularly central role in reforms aimed at e-discovery.156 Amendments to the federal rules since the 1980s have sought to strengthen judicial
case management by expanding the role of pretrial conferences and scheduling and granting the trial judge the authority to restrict excessive or
redundant discovery.157
In some sense, judicial discretion itself breaks the transsubstantive nature
of the rules because judges are able to authorize more discovery in areas of
litigation that they feel to be more important, such as civil rights litigation.158 On the other hand, as long as individual judicial proclivities balance
each other out, the system as a whole will not be lending extra support to

155 For a discussion tracing the development of the case management system, see Steven S.
Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 674-88 (2010). For a
more in-depth discussion of the debate surrounding a system of rules that emphasizes case
management and judicial discretion, see id. at 688-743.
156 Id. at 682-83.
157 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (providing for a pretrial conference and scheduling order); Miller,
supra note 10, at 55 (“The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules . . . were an attempt to reduce
cost and delay by giving district judges the tools to prevent excessive discovery and to take a more
active role in moving cases through pretrial and encouraging settlement.”).
158 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of
Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1929 (1989) (arguing that federal procedure is not uniform
because the rules “empower district judges to make ad hoc decisions”); Marcus, supra note 85, at
377 (noting scholars who make the argument that the rules are only superficially transsubstantive
because of the discretion they give to judges).
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particular substantive areas of litigation, as it would be with explicit,
generally applicable nontranssubstantive rules.159
A 1996 report commissioned by the Judicial Conference of the United
States contained a mixed analysis of active judicial case management: case
management was reported to reduce delay in litigation, but add significantly
to the cost to the courts.160 One of the main purported advantages of case
management is that the judge will set an earlier cut-off date for discovery,
rather than let the parties extend discovery indefinitely. The report found,
predictably, that a shorter time to discovery cut-off was associated with
reduced time to case disposition and reduced lawyer work hours.161 A
shorter discovery period also reduced the cost to litigants.162 However, a
shorter period for discovery was not significantly associated with changes in
either attorney or litigant satisfaction.163
Active judicial management of discovery, however, causes more problems than it solves. A judge supervising discovery cannot possibly know the
true value of any particular discovery request before the information is
produced.164 Therefore, judicial case management inherently involves large
amounts of uncontrolled judicial discretion, which raises concerns about
fairness and impartiality.165 Discovery orders are often made off the record
or are announced without an opinion, making any partiality difficult to
detect and control.166 Discovery orders are usually not final and are thus not
appealable; this insulation exacerbates any problems of partiality and
variance among judges.167
159 See Marcus, supra note 85, at 378 (“[N]othing in the discretion that the Federal Rules
provide manifests a systemic approval or disapproval of a particular substantive area of litigation.”).
160 JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, JUST, SPEEDY, AND
INEXPENSIVE?: AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT 14 (1996), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/
MR800.pdf; see also Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound
Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 93 (1997) (citing KAKALIK
ET AL., supra, at 1-2).
161 KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 160, at 16.
162 Id. But see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“[T]he success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.”).
163 KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 160, at 16.
164 See Easterbrook, supra note 49, at 638-39 (“Judicial officers cannot measure the costs and
benefits to the requester and so cannot isolate impositional requests.”).
165 See Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 424-31 (1982) (discussing
the vast power granted to judges in a system with active case management and the concomitant
threat to impartiality).
166 Moskowitz, supra note 134, at 127.
167 See id.; Resnick, supra note 165, at 380 (“[B]ecause managerial judging is less visible and
usually unreviewable, it gives trial courts more authority and at the same time provides litigants
with fewer procedural safeguards to protect them from abuse of that authority.”).
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Active judicial case management also diminishes the predictability of
litigation and the participatory roles of the community—in designing
procedure—and the litigants—in controlling the manner in which their case
is decided.168 Furthermore, active management of litigation consumes large
amounts of judicial resources169 and takes away from the time that judges
are able to devote to presiding over trials.170 As Professor Arthur Miller,
then the Reporter to the Advisory Committee, said, the federal rules have
“sold the judges into slavery” by making them “gatekeepers” charged with
controlling the extent of discovery.171 Rules that mandate pretrial conferences and other forms of active case management are particularly problematic because they result in an expenditure of resources even in the large
number of cases where discovery would otherwise play a minimal role.172
Robert Bone has suggested that giving judges “discretionary control over
discovery invites parties to contest discovery matters vigorously, which
compounds litigation costs and creates opportunities for strategic abuse.”173
168 Subrin, supra note 160, at 94. Professor Subrin notes the ways in which judicial case
management reduces community participation in litigation:

To the extent case management is truly ad hoc, the community, acting through advisory committees or Congress, has not participated in setting boundaries for the case.
To the extent that settlement is not only facilitated in a friendly way, but “urged” in
a more compelling fashion, party participation and community participation, through
the jury, are diminished. To the extent that judges are case-managing, they are not
deciding cases on the merits in open court, nor are they presiding over jury trials.
Id.
169 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 398 (“[C]ase management for all cases has the flaw of requiring a
good deal of judicial time.”). Subrin points out that in 1998, there were approximately one million
lawyers in the United States and 10,000 judges. Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective:
Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 310 (2002). Thus, there are not nearly enough judges to
assume the work of pretrial discovery currently performed by lawyers. Id.; see also Resnick, supra
note 165, at 423-24 (“The judge’s time is the most expensive resource in the courthouse.”).
170 See Carrington, supra note 13, at 61 (arguing that the most important function of district
judges is to try cases and that it would be a great loss if increased case management responsibilities
for judges took them away from that primary task). For a discussion of the negative effects of the
diminishing rate of trials, see Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy:
Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 401-03 (2011).
171 ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL C TR., THE AUGUST 1983 A MENDMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE M ANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 32 (1984), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/1983amnds.pdf/$file/1983amnds.pdf.
172 See Subrin, supra note 160, at 93-94 (arguing that because most cases do not produce
problematic discovery costs, it does not make sense to require judicial intervention in the average
case); see also supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (noting that a large number of cases involve
minimal or no discovery).
173 Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1961, 1964 (2007).

270

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 243

Indeed, the American legal system demonstrates an historic distrust of
giving this much power to a single entity, such as the judge.174 The right to
a jury trial, the adversary system, and the principles of federalism and
separation of powers are all meant to control the power of the judge.175
Although certain amounts of judicial discretion will always be necessary,
and most often harmless, allowing judges broad, unreviewable authority to
control the course of discovery is neither a workable nor a wise solution to
the problems associated with modern discovery.
B. Value-of-Claim Tracks
A narrower variation on nontranssubstantivity, which until now this
Comment has broadly taken to mean rules that apply different procedures
in different types of cases, is to apply different procedures depending on the
size of the claim. In such a system, cases are assigned to a track, with its
own set of procedures, based on the value of the claim, without regard to
the subject matter of the suit. Variations on this model might also take the
subject matter of the suit into account when assigning the case to a track.
The authors of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure designed the Rules
for complex litigation to be applicable in all cases.176 However, Professor
Weber has argued that greater efficiency can be obtained through the
creation of rules specifically for simple or low-stakes litigation.177 The
incentives for attorneys to use discovery to produce cost and delay for the
opposing party are particularly strong in smaller cases, because an economically rational litigant will focus on the proportion of threatened litigation
costs to the amount in controversy in deciding its settlement posture.178
Therefore, rules aimed at limiting discovery in smaller cases may be
particularly effective.
A number of states have implemented variations of the value-of-claim
tracks model.179 Texas has implemented a three track system which treats
174
175
176

Subrin, supra note 169, at 309.
See id.
See Mark C. Weber, The Federal Civil Rules Amendments of 1993 and Complex Litigation: A
Comment on Transsubstantivity and Special Rules for Large and Small Federal Cases, 14 REV. LITIG.
113, 115-26 (1994) (describing how the development of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
resulted in their being tailored especially for complex litigation).
177 See id. at 130 (suggesting that “special rules for smaller cases” would “increase speed and
reduce cost in federal civil justice without seriously detracting from the quality of adjudication”).
178 See id. (“The tactical advantages of complexity and delay are greatest in small and midsize cases because opponents who are economically rational will change their settlement posture
when litigation costs threaten to exceed the amount to be gained or saved by the case.”).
179 See Moskowitz, supra note 134, at 125.
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cases differently when the claim is valued under $50,000, when the claim is
for more than $50,000, and when the case is “exceptional” and therefore
subject to court-crafted discovery plans.180 Alaska rules limit discovery
specifically in personal injury or property damages cases for less than
$100,000.181 South Carolina rules allow physical or mental examinations only
in cases where the amount in controversy is greater than $100,000182 and oral
depositions only where the amount in controversy is greater than $10,000,
unless the parties agree or the court orders the deposition.183 Additionally,
parties may serve nonuniform interrogatories on other parties only in cases
valued at $25,000 or more.184
England has also implemented a system that applies different procedures to cases based on the value of the claim. Prior to the reforms of 1999,
document production procedure was based on the old English Judicature
Acts of 1873 and 1875.185 Disclosure operated in a manner similar to that in
the American system, except that relevancy was defined more narrowly.186
In 1999, however, the English procedural system underwent major reforms
led by Lord Woolf.187 The reforms were meant to emphasize case management and pretrial research.188 Under the new rules, lawyers are subject to
sanctions for filing frivolous writs.189 The reforms also heightened the
pleading standards.190 The case management system operates along three
tracks: small claims, mid-level claims worth £5000 to £15,000, and large
claims worth over £15,000.191 The small claims track is handled with
minimal supervision.192 The mid-level cases are put on a fast track to be
adjudicated at a one-day hearing within thirty weeks of being assigned to
that track.193 The larger cases, however, are given extensive hands-on judicial
management.194 Thus, the English system combines value-of-claim tracking
and active judicial case management. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the

180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194

See Weber, supra note 23, at 1064-65.
See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(g).
See S.C. R. CIV. P. 35(a).
See id. 30(a)(2).
See id. 33(b)(9).
See Subrin, supra note 169, at 303-04 (describing recent developments in the English rules).
Id.
Id. at 304.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 305.
Id.
Miller, supra note 10, at 121.
Id.
Subrin, supra note 169, at 305.
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reforms are working, with lawyers spending more time thinking about case
strategy rather than engaging in a discovery war of monetary attrition.195
Professors Stephen Burbank and Stephen Subrin have suggested implementing a tracking system based on the value of the claim in the federal
system.196 Like the British, they would adopt proportionality as the foundational principle behind the discovery rules.197 The tracking system would
help to ensure that discovery expenses are not disproportionate to the value
of the underlying claim. Track assignments would be made along strict (if
arbitrary) monetary guidelines,198 with the exception that cases in which
private litigants play a role in enforcing public law would always be placed
in the complex track.199 Track assignments would be made by federal
judges—rather than court clerks—and would be unreviewable, ensuring that
those assignments would not lead to additional disputes and create delay
and expense.200
For the simple-track cases, the expansive breadth of discovery currently
available under the federal rules would not be proportional. The cost of the
discovery allowed would greatly outweigh the significance of the case.
Lower limits might be set on the number of depositions or interrogatories
permissible.201 The rules might require more specificity in document
requests.202 Because the simple cases usually involve little discovery under
the current rules, the real cost savings would probably come in the ability to
eliminate the many procedural requirements—such as mandatory disclosure,

195
196
197

See id.
Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 408-12.
Id. at 409. The British system places an emphasis on proportionality “(i) to the amount of
money involved; (ii) to the importance of the case; (iii) to the complexity of the issues; and (iv) to
the financial position of each party.” CIV. P.R. 1.1(2)(c) (Eng.), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/
civil/procrules_fin/contents/parts/part01.htm#IDATBTQ.
198 Acknowledging that the line would need to be arbitrarily drawn, Professors Burbank and
Subrin suggest that cases involving less than $500,000 in controversy be assigned to the simple
track. Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 411-12.
199 Objective factors, such as statutory multiple damages provisions or fee-shifting provisions, would determine when a private litigant was helping to enforce a public law. Id. at 411-12;
Subrin, supra note 5, at 400; see also Weber, supra note 176, at 133 (noting that “not all cases that
fall below the threshold should be subject to the small case rules” because “[s]ome cases,
particularly civil rights and discrimination matters, embody claims for vindication that go beyond
the dollar amount sought for recovery”).
200 Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 411 (noting that, to reduce “the likelihood of costly
satellite litigation” over tracking decisions, courts must “provide sufficiently objective and
determinate criteria for the initial decision and not . . . permit any appeal”).
201 Id. at 410; Subrin, supra note 5, at 399.
202 Subrin, supra note 5, at 399.
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discovery conferences, and pretrial conferences—that have been implemented in an attempt to control discovery in complex cases.203
Value-of-claim tracks can be very useful in ensuring the proportionality
of discovery. To the extent that the applicable procedures are determined
solely based on the amount in controversy, such a system will ensure
proportionality to the amount involved. The system will only allow for a
vast expenditure of resources on discovery where the potential benefit or
liability, measured by the potential outcome of the case, justifies such
expenditure.
However, a value-of-claims approach to nontranssubstantivity would
not be enough to fix the discovery system. Discovery procedures that track
only the amount in controversy might lead to the available procedures being
disproportionate to the importance of the case, as measured not by the
potential monetary award but rather by social gain or other factors.204
Therefore, a value-of-claims system must be modified to create exceptions
for certain types of cases, such as those involving private enforcement of
public law, as suggested by Professors Burbank and Subrin.205
Even a value-of-claims approach that accounts for nonmonetary measures
of the importance of a case, however, would not ensure that discovery is
proportionate to the complexity of the issues involved. For example, it may
be necessary to afford broader discovery mechanisms in a securities fraud
case valued at $50 million than a simple contract case valued at the same
amount. To achieve proportionality that actually corresponds to the importance of the case, the procedures must be attuned to the type of case.
A pure value-of-claims approach would also fail to tailor the available
discovery devices as narrowly as possible to the substance of the litigation.
For instance, it may be that the proper limitations on discovery in a medical
malpractice case would permit more physical examinations but would limit
the potential for document discovery. Assigning procedures to cases based
solely on the value of the claim would not allow for a way to make these
adjustments.
Finally, as Professors Burbank and Subrin note, a value-of-claims system
would not rein in the costs of discovery in high-stakes cases on the complex

203
204

See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 409-10; Subrin, supra note 5, at 399-400.
Moreover, it would be difficult to valuate claims for injunctive relief. Professor Weber
has suggested dealing with this problem by exempting almost all cases for injunctive relief from
the simple-claims track. Weber, supra note 176, at 134.
205 See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 411-12 (recommending that “cases implicating
the private enforcement of public law” not be termed “simple” cases because “broader discovery
than that available in the simple case track may be necessary for adequate enforcement”).
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track.206 The complex track would still need to allow for a range of broad
discovery procedures for the cases that actually require them. Other cases
that are placed on the complex track based on a high amount in controversy
and that do not actually require expansive discovery would still present the
potential for inefficient overuse or abuse of discovery.
V. CREATING A SYSTEM OF NONTRANSSUBSTANTIVE RULES
TO FIT MODERN DISCOVERY
A. A Nontranssubstantive Discovery Alternative
A system of nontranssubstantive discovery rules that will provide for
efficient case management and reduce the overuse and abuse of discovery
will begin with case-type–specific discovery rules, but will also likely need
to include elements of both an active judicial case management model and a
value-of-claim tracking model. The base of the discovery system should be
nontranssubstantive at the case-type level so that the discovery devices and
their permitted scope will respond most closely to the issues that are most
important to the claims. Because each type of claim will present different
needs, case-type–specific nontranssubstantive rules will permit rulemakers
to craft discovery procedures more narrowly.
However, it may be necessary to make alterations in the discovery rules
based on the value of the claim even once the procedures are narrowed in
type and scope to the needs of the substantive area. These further alterations would diminish the opportunity for overuse of discovery. Value-ofclaims distinctions can also ensure that discovery-narrowing mechanisms,
such as disclosure or discovery conferences, are not employed where their
cost is disproportionate to the amount in controversy. Thus, even though
different discovery rules will apply in different types of litigation, more
general rules might declare that, regardless of the applicable set of rules,
automatic initial disclosures will not be required in any case where the
amount in controversy is less than $250,000.207
Finally, active judicial management will also be necessary in certain
types of complex litigation. Discovery in the most complex types of cases
with a large amount in controversy cannot be totally delimited ex ante. The
particular demands of these cases will sometimes require a judge to consider
the discovery demanded in the context of the case. Prior to the start of
206
207

Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 412.
Such mechanisms will not necessarily be available for every type of case. Litigation in
some substantive areas may be so simple that a discovery conference would be unnecessary
regardless of the value of the claim.
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discovery, judges may also need to take an active role in clarifying the
procedures to be followed in cases that touch upon multiple substance areas.
Although judicial discretion will give rise to concerns of partiality, a certain
degree of unpredictability, and the other problems discussed above,208 such
discretion can never be totally eliminated. The goal of crafting narrow,
nontranssubstantive rules is to reduce the amount of discretion that
individual judges will need to exercise, thereby lessening these concerns.
A system of layered nontranssubstantivity like that proposed would help
to ensure proportionality in a number of different ways.209 The base of casetype–specific rules will ensure that discovery is proportional to the complexity of the issues and the social importance of the litigation. Rulemakers
would allow for broader discovery in types of litigation where the issues are
not as clear, but narrow the scope of discovery in litigation where the issues
are more likely to be straightforward, thus limiting the opportunity for abuse.
Rules that apply differently based on the size of the claim will ensure
that the resources spent in the conduct of litigation are proportionate to the
value of the judgment at stake. Further, active judicial case management
will allow judges to tailor the rules to the particulars of the case at bar and
ensure that discovery remains proportional to the resources of the individual
parties.
B. Accounting for Value-Based Judgments in the
Creation of Nontranssubstantive Rules
As discussed above, one of the major advantages of using nontranssubstantive rules is the possibility of reducing waste and abuse by narrowly
tailoring discovery procedures to the needs of particular types of cases.
Another of the major advantages of using nontranssubstantive rules is that
they allow rulemakers to curb discovery costs selectively by limiting
discovery in some types of cases while allowing more expansive discovery in
others. In so doing, rulemakers can consider the substantive goals of the
laws. Rulemakers might decide that high discovery costs are acceptable in
certain types of litigation but unnecessary or counterproductive in others.
In making these determinations, rulemakers should consider both how
discovery can promote procedural justice as well as how it can aid in the
effective enforcement of the laws. Rather than trying to separate procedure
208 Largely unfettered judicial discretion takes desirable control away from litigants and
imposes an undesirable burden on judicial time and resources. See supra notes 164-75 and
accompanying text.
209 For a description of different measures of proportionality considered by the British
procedural system, see infra text accompanying note 216.
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from substantive law, rulemakers can embrace the impact that discovery
rules can have on the outcome of litigation. If discovery is going to be an
expensive process, the costs should be targeted to where they can be most
effective, both in giving the parties access to information and in promoting
substantive goals.
1. Using Discovery to Promote Procedural Justice
Before rulemakers create a system of nontranssubstantive rules, they
must first determine which factors to consider. In many ways, these guiding
principles will be the same as those that are always employed when rulemakers craft procedural rules. However, because nontransubstantive rules
will be narrowly crafted to fit the substance of litigation, their potential
effect on outcomes will be more obvious. As opposed to the drafting of
transsubstantive rules, where rulemakers can pretend that procedure is a
value-free science,210 the crafting of substance-specific procedures will require
rulemakers to confront openly the challenge of making value judgments.
Stephen Subrin identifies ten values that procedure may be designed to
serve:
(1) resolving and ending disputes peacefully; (2) efficiency; (3) fulfilling
societal norms through law-application; (4) accurate ascertainment of facts;
(5) predictability; (6) enhancing human dignity; (7) adding legitimacy and
stability to government and society; (8) permitting citizens to partake in
governance; (9) aiding the growth and improvement of law; (10) restraining
or enhancing power.211

I would add to this list the value of equal treatment of the parties.
Rulemakers may also take a sociological approach by designing procedure
that keeps in mind the political, social, and economic effects of the rules.212
In designing substance-specific procedure, rulemakers will have the opportunity and challenge of deciding which of these values will be given
primary emphasis in each type of litigation. Rulemakers may decide to
create discovery rules for civil rights litigation that will place more emphasis
on human dignity or community participation. Conversely, the procedure
to be utilized in contract disputes may place more emphasis on predictability.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 88-91 (discussing the view that procedure and substantive law are separate and distinct in the context of the Rules Enabling Act and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure).
211 Stephen N. Subrin, On Thinking About a Description of a Country’s Civil Procedure, 7 TUL. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 139, 140 (1999).
212 Id. at 142.
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More extensive discovery might thus be needed in civil rights litigation to
impart a feeling of transparency in such matters. On the other hand,
predictability might be obtained in contract disputes by strictly limiting
discovery to a certain set of documents so that the parties know ex ante
what facts the counterparty will be able to obtain in any litigation that
might result.
Discovery, like many areas of procedure, presents an opportunity for
rulemakers to craft processes that will contribute greatly to procedural
justice. If litigants are to come away from the courts feeling that they were
afforded a fair adjudication of their claim, they must feel that they were
given an adequate opportunity both to obtain the facts critical to their case
and to present those facts to an impartial court. Unnecessarily limited
discovery procedures may leave litigants with the feeling that they were
helpless in their quest to find and convince the court of the truth. This
concern looms especially large in litigation where a party with fewer
resources files suit against a more powerful, better-resourced adversary. The
smaller party must be made to feel that it has been given the opportunity to
develop fairly the factual record in spite of the inequalities. Of course, this
concern needs to be balanced against the needs of their counterparties,
usually corporations or government, to be free from harassing, meritless
lawsuits. Procedural justice also dictates that defendants not leave the courts
feeling that they can be bullied by frivolous but expensive lawsuits.
A recent study by the Federal Judicial Center asked attorneys whether
they believed that the discovery produced in one of their recent closed cases
increased the fairness of the outcome in that case.213 About 45% of plaintiffs’
attorneys and 39% of defendants’ attorneys agreed or strongly agreed that
the discovery increased the fairness of the outcome.214 Only about 12% of
plaintiffs’ attorneys and 14% of defendants’ attorneys disagreed or strongly
disagreed with the statement, with the rest ambivalent or declining to
answer.215 Further research should determine in which types of cases
discovery contributed the most to perceived fairness of outcome. Such data
could greatly assist rulemakers in crafting discovery rules that would best
leave litigants with the feeling that they were afforded procedural justice,
regardless of the outcome of their case.
Another factor that should be taken into account in crafting nontranssubstantive discovery rules is proportionality. Since the reforms of
1999, the British procedural system has sought to attain four types of
213
214
215

LEE & WILLGING, supra note 54, at 29-30.
Id.
Id.
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proportionality: “(i) to the amount of money involved; (ii) to the importance of the case; (iii) to the complexity of the issues; and (iv) to the
financial position of each party.”216 As discussed above, nontranssubstantive
rules are particularly well-suited to provide proportionality in each of these
areas.217
Other considerations for rulemakers include looking at who has access to
the information and how much discovery is necessary to make that information available to both parties. Additionally, in crafting rules of discovery,
rulemakers will have to confront the question of deciding who should bear
the cost of discovery. The 1938 rules shifted the cost of discovery to the
producing party. Rulemakers must acknowledge that this is a normative
choice that will usually favor plaintiffs, because defendants usually have
access to the information and are thus the producing party. Rulemakers will
need to be conscious of how this choice affects incentives to litigate or to
settle.218
Finally, rulemakers need to recognize that more information is not always better. There is an endless amount of information and at some point
the cost of uncovering that information outweighs the marginal benefit.219
There must be limits to discovery and its potentially enormous costs, even
at the risk of missing critical information in some cases. Thus, it is time to
reconsider Sunderland’s effort to make all types of discovery available to
every litigant.220
When crafting substance-specific procedure, rulemakers are forced to
make value-based decisions about what processes to implement in different
types of litigation. One danger in crafting procedure in this way is that it
opens up the process to influence from interest groups. However, this
problem can be dealt with through transparency and by allocating the task
of rulemaking to the correct bodies.221

216 CIV. P.R. 1.1(2)(c) (Eng.), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/contents/
parts/part01.htm#IDATBTQ.
217 See supra text accompanying note 209.
218 See generally Avery Wiener Katz & Chris William Sanchirico, Fee Shifting in Litigation:
Survey and Assessment (Univ. of Pa. L. Sch. Inst. for L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 10-30, 2010),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1714089 (surveying economic literature on the effects of
fee-shifting on incentives to expend resources in litigation, decisions to bring suit, settlement
strategies, and incentives for efficient primary behavior).
219 Cf. Subrin, supra note 211, at 147 (suggesting that this insight likely comes from the law
and economics movement).
220 On Sunderland as the main architect of the federal discovery rules, see supra Section I.B.
221 See infra Section V.D (proposing and highlighting the benefits of a potential structure for
such a rulemaking body).
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2. Using Discovery to Promote Substantive Goals
Procedure can be used to promote substantive goals and achieve substantive fairness the same way that it can be designed to optimize procedural
fairness. In designing nontranssubstantive rules, rulemakers must determine
to what degree they want to craft procedures that will promote the substantive goals of litigation. Framed another way, rulemakers will have to
consider whether they want to allow more discovery in certain types of
cases—and thus higher discovery costs—in order to promote the substantive
goals underlying the litigation. Private litigation that enforces federal
statutes constitutes a particular set of cases in which rulemakers may want
to further substantive goals.
Recent literature has recognized that it is often a matter of legislative
choice to encourage private litigation as an enforcement mechanism for
federal law.222 In a recent book on the topic, Professor Sean Farhang notes
that there has been a shift since the 1960s from a bureaucracy-centered
approach to enforcement to a private litigation approach.223 When Congress
encourages private litigation, it in effect enlists citizens as law enforcement
officials.224 For example, by allowing private citizens to file suit for employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
Congress created less need for federal agencies to oversee compliance.225
Congress can encourage such private litigation by influencing access to
the plaintiff status,226 the expected benefits of litigation,227 the probability of
prevailing,228 or the expected cost of the litigation.229 Granting broad
discovery rights in this kind of litigation confers upon private litigants the
kind of investigatory powers normally bestowed upon federal agencies, such
as the power to compel sworn testimony or the production of documents.230
222 See FARHANG, supra note 10, at 3 (“The existence and extent of private litigation enforcing a statute is to an important degree the product of legislative choice over questions of statutory
design.”).
223 Id. at 4.
224 Id. at 9.
225 See id. at 4, 98-114 (describing Congress’s choice to encourage a robust scheme of private
enforcement of the Civil Rights Act in lieu of a stronger administrative enforcement authority).
226 Access to plaintiff status can be affected by granting broader citizen standing, lengthening
statutes of limitations, or allowing for class actions. Id. at 25-28.
227 Providing for minimum damages or triple damages will raise the potential award for a
successful plaintiff. Id. at 28-30.
228 The probability of prevailing can be influenced through, among other things, changing
burdens of proof, standards of proof, or rules of evidence. Id. at 28 & tbl.2.2.
229 Filing fees and attorney fee–shifting provisions are examples of ways in which the expected
cost of litigation can be altered. Id.
230 Id. at 8.
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Granting broader discovery rights will increase the probability of a plaintiff
prevailing.
Allowing for private litigation in this manner is a conscious and substantive choice by the legislature to increase the level of enforcement of the
underlying law. Professor Farhang notes that the reasons a legislature would
favor enforcement through private litigation are political.231 Conflicts
between the legislative and executive branches will push Congress to rely
on private litigation as a method of statutory implementation, as a way to
bypass the enforcement role of a hostile executive branch.232 Derailing
private enforcement can only be done through the difficult legislative
process of repeal and cannot be accomplished by the Executive alone.233
Professors Burbank and Subrin would create exceptions in their valueof-claim tracking system for litigation where Congress meant to encourage
private enforcement (seen through statutory damages, attorney fee–shifting
provisions, or other objectively identifiable signals).234 They see broader
discovery rules for these cases as a way of promoting the legislative intent
of “adequate enforcement.”235 Although procedural rules can and should be
used as a means of affecting underlying substantive rights by modifying the
level of enforcement, this is an area in which the judicial branch should
avoid interfering. If a robust system of private enforcement is the result of
conflict between the political branches of government, the judicial branch
may be best served by not taking sides. The decision to allow more robust
discovery in certain types of cases is better left to Congress than judicial
rulemakers.236
Nontranssubstantive rules have the advantage that procedures can be
crafted in ways that will promote the substantive goals of particular sets of
law. Discovery rules should be utilized to encourage citizen enforcement of
the laws, and should be seen as an effective tool in the attainment of litigant
rights in many substantive areas. Procedure plays a large role in influencing
substantive outcomes. In crafting nontranssubstantive rules, rulemakers will
certainly have to, and should, decide how they can influence the rights of
the parties through the rules. Indeed, Congress has shown its willingness to
231
232
233
234
235
236

See id. at 19-20.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 5.
Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 411.
Id.
Recognition of these concerns may explain why courts of equity have traditionally seen it
as outside of their role to promote the enforcement of penalty provisions. See supra note 96. As noted
above, penalty provisions can be a mechanism used by the legislature to adjust the level of private
enforcement of the law. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
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alter procedure as a method of accomplishing its substantive goals.237
However, one should be wary about allowing rulemakers in the judicial
branch to make these determinations, as Congress has demonstrated that it
will alter procedural rules where it finds such adjustment necessary to
calibrate the level of enforcement of particular statutes.238
C. Discovery Reforms that Will Reduce Costs
There are a number of possible changes to the discovery rules that rulemakers should consider in their efforts to reduce the cost of discovery. First,
where the type or size of a case makes initial required disclosures unnecessary or inefficient, the disclosure rules should not apply. For those types of
cases where certain sets of information will always aid the litigation process,
a required core of discovery should mandate disclosure of that information
with as much specificity as possible.239
Further, pattern interrogatories and pattern requests for production
should be developed to make basic discovery more efficient and less
costly.240 Pattern discovery rules would set forth the types of requests that
should be honored quickly and without dispute.241 Parties would use pattern
discovery requests as necessary. There would be a strong presumption that
interrogatories and requests for production set out in such rules would be
237 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (discussing procedural reforms in the
context of prison litigation and securities litigation).
238 The rulemaking committee should therefore be situated in the legislative branch. See infra
Section V.D.
239 See Subrin, supra note 114, at 48 (advocating a clear description of the required core
discovery in particular types of cases).
240 See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text (describing recent efforts to develop pattern
discovery for employment discrimination litigation); supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text
(describing pattern interrogatories in the states). The recent efforts to develop pattern discovery
in the federal system represent an important start to this process. Pattern discovery should be
developed for litigation in a wide range of substantive areas.
241 An initial proposal by the National Employment Lawyers Association demonstrates the
types of pattern interrogatories and pattern requests for production that might be used in an
employment discrimination case. Pattern interrogatories might ask the defendant to state the
reasons for the adverse action taken against the plaintiff, describe any workplace misconduct
allegedly committed by the plaintiff, and list the identities of any other employees against whom
the defendant took the challenged responsive action. Memorandum from Garrison & Hamburg,
supra note 106, at attachment 2, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2010-11.pdf at 630-35. Pattern requests for production might ask
the defendant to produce the plaintiff’s personnel file, the plaintiff’s compensation records,
documents and communications related to any investigation of any complaint made by the
plaintiff, and any documents describing the reasons for the adverse action taken against the
plaintiff. Id. at attachment 3, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2010-11.pdf at 636-39.
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reasonable; parties would thus be discouraged from disputing such requests.
Parties to litigation would know to expect requests for the materials set
forth in the pattern discovery rules and would be expected to answer
interrogatories or produce requested records quickly. Pattern discovery would
speed the initial stages of discovery and, by reducing discovery disputes at
this stage, reduce the cost of initial discovery. Pattern discovery also has the
added benefit of making clear to pro se litigants the basic materials that will
help them to develop their cases.
While many cases may not require discovery beyond that prescribed in
the required core discovery or pattern discovery provisions, further reforms
are necessary for those cases that will require extensive discovery beyond
those initial requests. A recent report by the American College of Trial
Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and the Institute for Advancement of the
American Legal System listed nine suggested reforms to cut the costs of
discovery:
(1) limitations on scope of discovery (i.e., changes in the definition of
relevance);
(2) limitations on persons from whom discovery can be sought;
(3) limitations on the types of discovery (e.g., only document discovery,
not interrogatories);
(4) numerical limitations (e.g., only 20 interrogatories or requests for
admissions; only 50 hours of deposition time);
(5) elimination of depositions of experts where their testimony is strictly
limited to the contents of their written report;
(6) limitations on the time available for discovery;
(7) cost shifting/co-pay rules;
(8) financial limitations (i.e., limits on the amount of money that can be
spent—or that one party can require its opponent to spend—on discovery);
and
(9) discovery budgets that are approved by the clients and the court.242

These limitations would generally be presumptive rules subject to alteration by the court upon a showing of good cause.243 Examining specific types
of cases would allow rulemakers to consider what information is generally
known to the parties at different stages of the litigation and what the norms
are for the numbers of depositions and interrogatories or the types or
242
243

IAALS REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-11.
See Subrin, supra note 114, at 48 (“Although cases of certain varieties have predictable,
normal characteristics, presumptive rules would permit parties to seek, and judges to order,
variations when the case has unique problems.”).
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amounts of documents subject to discovery.244 Rulemakers would also be
able to gauge the level of specificity with which litigants should be able to
make discovery requests in different types of litigation.245 Using this kind of
empirical evidence to create limiting rules will constrain parties and reduce
abuse of the discovery system. It will also provide clients, lawyers, and
judges with more predictability.
Another reform might be to simplify discovery procedures in types of
cases in which pro se representation is more common or encouraged.246 For
instance, discovery rules might be simplified in certain types of prisoner
litigation, in which over 93% of cases are filed pro se.247 This would aid
litigants unfamiliar with the technical procedures of the courts.
The greatest source of cost and the most difficult discovery device to
limit is document discovery.248 Requiring greater specificity in demands for
documents, where possible, may help reduce the costs of searching for and
producing those documents.249 Another possible reform would be to set a
presumptive time window for discoverable documents (i.e., documents
created within a set number of years prior to the alleged illegal or harmful
conduct).250 Creating nontranssubstantive rules would allow each of these
reforms to reflect the unique opportunities and problems presented by
varying types of litigation. Narrowly tailored rules would reduce the need
for judicial case management, although the rules would be subject to
alteration by the court for good cause, to allow for needed flexibility in
unusual or unforeseen circumstances.
D. The Rulemaking Body
The complexity of nontranssubstantive rules and the challenge that they
present in making value judgments keyed to specific areas of litigation will
require innovative rulemaking processes. Professors Burbank and Subrin
have suggested that rulemakers work with the plaintiffs’ and defendants’

244
245
246

See generally id. at 49.
Id.
Cf. S.C. R. FAM. CT. 25 (prohibiting formal depositions or discovery in family court
proceedings, except upon stipulation of the parties or order of the court).
247 See Judicial Business tbl.S-23, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/Judicial
Business/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/tables/S23Sep09.pdf
(last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (providing data on pro se filings across the states).
248 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
249 See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 411.
250 Id.
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bars to develop discovery protocols.251 Their proposal presents the possibility that through discussion and negotiation, innovative solutions can be
found to address the rising burdens of discovery.252 It also ensures that the
most knowledgeable experts in each substantive field of litigation have a
role in shaping the procedures to be used. This proposed process for
discovery reform is similar to that used by administrative agencies in
negotiated rulemaking.253 Because nontranssubstantive discovery rules will
necessarily be more complex and will have to respond to the particularities
of different types of litigation, this process of expert-based reform would be
a much better method of crafting rules than leaving the job solely to
procedural generalists.
There have been previous efforts to make rules through committees of
this kind. An effort led by the National Employment Lawyers Association
brings together various stakeholders to develop pattern discovery for
employment discrimination litigation.254 A group composed of members of
the plaintiffs’ employment bar, NELA is working with a group from the
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, a group of
management-side attorneys.255 This effort seeks to identify which discovery
requests are acceptable on all sides and can be streamlined. Including judges
in a committee of this type would help to determine what works from the
judiciary’s perspective.256
There is a further question regarding whether the judicial branch can
properly make nontranssubstantive discovery rules. The Rules Enabling
Act, which authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, directs that procedural rules “shall not abridge, enlarge

251 Id. at 412; see also Subrin, supra note 5, at 405 (suggesting also possibly including clients in
the rulemaking process).
252 But see Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 916 (1999) (“[I]nsofar as consensus involves
accommodating conflicting interests, it aligns court rulemaking so closely with legislation that it is
unclear why the rulemaking task should be given to the courts at all.”).
253 See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (1982)
(proposing that regulatory rules be made by “group consensus” reached through “negotiation
among representatives of the interested parties, including administrative agencies”).
254 See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text (discussing NELA’s attempt to tailor
discovery mechanisms to the substance of the litigation).
255 See Memorandum from Garrison & Hamburg, supra note 106, at 1-2 (describing the
formation of an Employment Protocols Committee); Memorandum from Kravitz, supra note 105,
at 14 (describing the committee as “including strong representation of both plaintiff and defense
lawyers”).
256 Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Draft Minutes 32 (Nov. 15–16, 2010), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2011-04.pdf at 56.

2012]

Nontranssubstantivity and Discovery Reform

285

or modify any substantive right.”257 Under the Supreme Court’s current
interpretation of this clause, the proper test for determining the validity of
a judicially promulgated rule is “whether a rule really regulates procedure,—
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them.”258 Although case-type–specific discovery rules might be
permissible under this wooden reading of the Rules Enabling Act, they
might modify substantive rights. In nontranssubstantive rulemaking, rulemakers would undoubtedly be forced to make value judgments in their
determinations of which rules should apply in which types of cases. The
discovery system that resulted from such a practice would surely “modify”
substantive rights.
By directing that procedures promulgated by the Supreme Court should
avoid modifying the substantive law, the Rules Enabling Act implies that
value neutrality is possible (and indeed desirable) in procedure.259 As noted
above, the goal of value neutrality was one factor that pushed the drafters of
the original federal rules toward transsubstantivity.260 But more recently,
scholars have attacked the notion of value-neutral procedures.261 The
substantive nature of procedure becomes even more obvious, however, in
nontranssubstantive rules, and it is inevitable that in crafting nontranssubstantive rules, rulemakers will be forced to make value-based decisions
affecting substantive rights. The substantive nature of such rules would be
more apparent still if rulemakers were to shape discovery rules to respond
to signs in legislation—such as fee-shifting provisions or statutory damages—
and strengthen a legislative intent to promote private litigation as an
enforcement mechanism of statutory law.262 To the extent that more
expansive discovery encourages litigation by increasing the chances that the
plaintiff will prevail, it modifies the existing rights and liabilities of those
governed by the laws. Thus, under the current statutory scheme allocating
257
258
259

28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
See Marcus, supra note 85, at 395-97 (describing contemporary views about the “substance–
procedure dichotomy”).
260 See supra text accompanying notes 88-92 (describing reasons for the rulemakers’ choice of
transsubstantive rules).
261 See Bone, supra note 252, at 907-14 (“The traditional belief in a procedural ideal and a
clear normative divide between procedure and substance is no longer persuasive.”); Stephen B.
Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1472-73 (1987) (book review) (challenging the neutrality thesis). The Supreme Court, too, has noted that court rules are “substantive and
political in the sense that the rules of procedure have important effects on the substantive rights of
litigants.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989).
262 See supra subsection V.B.2.
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rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court, Congress would probably be
required to enact nontranssubstantive discovery rules itself.
Even if Congress were to grant expanded authority to the Supreme
Court to promulgate discovery rules along the lines outlined in this Article,
the legislative branch would nevertheless be the more appropriate forum for
the development of such rules.263 Nontranssubstantive rules provide
expanded opportunities for interest groups to influence rulemakers.264 They
also present opportunities for negotiation and compromise among interested
groups.265 The legislative branch is the more appropriate institution for
consensus-building and managing the politics of competing interest
groups.266 Nevertheless, the judiciary should be actively involved in the
263 There will certainly be some rules that can be made properly by a committee situated in
the judicial branch. Some rules are truly procedural in that they deal with how the courts conduct
their business. Compliance with these rules is simple for all parties interested in duly pressing
their claims or defenses; these rules neither modify the substantive rights of the parties nor affect
their chances of prevailing in the litigation. Examples of such rules might include time limits for
simple filings, requirements that the parties use certain forms, or rules governing the ways in
which the parties communicate with each other or the court. These rules are best formulated by a
committee in the judicial branch, whose members are more likely to be acquainted with court
procedure in a way that helps them formulate rules for the expedient functioning of the courts.
The Rules Enabling Act currently provides that federal rules take effect automatically after
promulgation by the Supreme Court and a waiting period in which Congress can override the
proposed rules. 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006). For truly procedural rules, this system works best in that
rules designed to aid the conduct of judicial business can be made effective without Congress
having to undertake the slow legislative process of statutory enactment. This Comment asserts
only that rules that will have more of a substantive effect on litigants’ rights, including substancespecific discovery rules that impact a litigant’s access to information that may be critical to his
case, are better crafted in a legislative committee and enacted by Congress. Cf. Stephen B.
Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 145-46 (1994) (suggesting a two-tiered system in which rules more
properly made through legislation would be formulated and recommended by the current
rulemaking committee, but would require legislative action before taking effect).
264 Cf. supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text (explaining how transsubstantive rules
reduce the risk of interest group influence).
265 See supra notes 251-56 and accompanying text.
266 Professor Paul Stancil argues that committee rulemaking helps to lessen the influence of
interest groups. See Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The Committee Rulemaking
Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69, 119-21 (2010) (“[C]ommittee rulemaking enjoys substantial advantages
over other potential forms of procedural system design in the form of expertise advantages and
insulation from interest group risk.”). Professor Stancil points out two factors that may lead to
interest groups having less influence over committee rulemaking than rulemaking by Congress
members: (1) because of Congress members’ lack of expertise in judicial procedure and the scarcity
of Congress’s time, Congress relies on interest groups for information, thereby opening up
Congress members to misinformation; (2) unlike Congress members, the judges and academics
who make up the rule advisory committees do not rely on campaign contributions from interest
groups to get reelected. Id. at 120. To the extent that lobbying does take place even in committee
rulemaking, and to the extent that it would increase with a nontranssubstantive system, a
committee of judges, academics, and lawyers located in the legislative branch would benefit from
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rulemaking process, as it is clearly better equipped to evaluate existing
procedures and create an integrated system of rules.267 Thus, the ideal
rulemaking body would be a committee created by Congress and subject to
congressional oversight, but led by representatives of the judiciary and
composed of judges, law professors, members of the relevant bars, and
major repeat clients interested in the substantive field.
CONCLUSION
The demand for discovery reform is widespread and the need for such
reform, at least in some types of cases, is apparent. To some, the problems
with the current system of discovery stem from abuse and overuse of the
system that costs litigants unreasonable amounts, thereby keeping plaintiffs
with meritorious suits out of court and forcing defendants who should
prevail on the merits to the settlement table. Although exorbitant discovery
does occur in some cases, the degree to which runaway discovery costs
actually accrue and create these pressures on litigants is uncertain; more
empirical research is necessary. To others, the problems with discovery
stem from needless procedures that make the cost of litigation in simple
cases too high for many plaintiffs and drain the resources of the federal
courts and judiciary. Although the empirical evidence of the costs created
by needless discovery procedures is uncertain, these charges are also surely
accurate in some cases.
Nontranssubstantive discovery rules, and in particular subject matterspecific discovery rules, could provide a useful mechanism through which
rulemakers redraft discovery rules more narrowly. A nontranssubstantive
system of discovery rules would begin with rules that vary based on type of
case and respond to the unique needs and circumstances presented by
different types of litigation. Some further layer of value-of-claim tracking
would ensure that discovery is kept proportional to the value of the case.
Active judicial case management would be appropriate only in the most
complex cases and for issues that cannot be predicted by rulemakers
creating a system ex ante. These reforms would prevent some of the abuse
the same insulating factors as a committee located in the judicial branch. Because such lobbying is
certain to occur, moving the rulemaking process to the legislative branch would protect the
character and reputation of the judicial branch. Additionally, a closer relationship with Congress
should help the rulemaking committee consider competing interests openly and reach satisfactory
compromises. See Bone, supra note 252, at 916-17 (“The legislature is the institution in our
democracy that is designed to accommodate interests . . . .”).
267 See Bone, supra note 252, at 890 (“Court rulemaking is better suited than legislation to
the task of inferring general principles from existing practice and designing an integrated system
of rules based on those principles.”).
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of discovery in cases in which discovery costs are currently too high by
narrowly tailoring rules to case type. They would ensure that discovery is
kept relevant to the issues at hand and is conducted in the most efficacious
manner given the unique needs of such litigation. A nontranssubstantive
discovery system would also help to eliminate unnecessary discovery
procedures in cases in which minimal or no discovery is needed, thereby
helping to reduce costs for small-claims plaintiffs and the judicial system.
These savings would also allow judges to spend more time fulfilling their
primary function of overseeing trials.
A system of nontranssubstantive rules as described above would surely be
much more complex than the current system of discovery. However, procedure in small claims would often be made simpler by nontranssubstantive
rules, and the specialist lawyers who litigate the more complex cases would
easily be able to comprehend the intricacies of the discovery rules relevant
to their line of work. Furthermore, because discovery rules would be more
narrowly tailored to the needs of the case, the rules would apply in a more
logical way to the particular litigation.
To say only that a nontranssubstantive system will reduce waste and
abuse through the creation of narrowly tailored rules, however, is to ignore
one of the major advantages of nontranssubstantive rules: substance-specific
rules will also allow rulemakers to allocate the costs of discovery. More
expensive discovery could be allowed, or even encouraged, in certain types
of cases in order to promote goals of substantive and procedural fairness. In
this way, the discovery process can be harnessed as a tool to promote the
underlying goals of the substantive law. More extensive discovery might be
allowed in cases in which it is necessary to achieve procedural justice for the
parties or those in which it will result in better enforcement of the law.
A primary difficulty that would certainly arise in drafting nontranssubstantive rules is that rulemakers would need to make value-based decisions
in crafting those rules. The rulemaking process would become the target of
interest group activity even more than it already is. The rulemaking process
outlined above, which gathers key players together to draft the rules
through a process of negotiation and compromise, would help to smooth the
process of reform. Placing a rulemaking committee entrusted with this kind
of reform of the discovery procedures in the legislative branch would best
comport with functional and political realities.
Discovery reform toward nontranssubstantive rules would be a massive
undertaking. The result would be a much larger set of discovery rules,
although the set of discovery rules applicable to any particular case would
be smaller. Such a reform would probably take a considerable amount of
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time.268 Rulemakers could start by creating discovery rules applicable in
broad categories of cases (e.g., personal injury, employment) and then
subdivide those categories with more particular sets of rules as necessary.
Further research should demonstrate in which types of cases discovery leads
to the most waste and abuse; rulemakers should focus their initial efforts on
these types of cases.269
*

*

*

The current discovery system imposes costs on litigants and the court
system that are too burdensome to ignore. Although a move to nontranssubstantive discovery rules would be a radical change for the federal
court system, movement in that direction has already occurred at the state
level and, to a minimal degree, at the federal level. Such a system offers
the promise of lower costs for litigants and the federal courts. Nontranssubstantive rules would also ensure that the remaining costs would be
allocated in a more deliberate and effective manner. Rather than condemning
all discovery, perhaps it is time to tailor discovery rules to litigation.

268 Such a large undertaking would not be unprecedented. The restyling project, which sought
to change the words and style of nearly all of the federal rules, took nearly a decade and a half to
complete. Jeremy Counseller, Rooting for the Restyled Rules (Even Though I Opposed Them), 78 MISS.
L.J. 519, 521 (2009).
269 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.

